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Dear readers: We restart the UCIPR's in-house publication, the weekly Research Update, with mixed
feelings. On the one hand, we are happy to be able to produce the bulletin again. On the other hand, we
regret that the first issue addressed by the Research Update after a long break is the crisis that may
challenge the current security system and bring about reconsideration of a number of basic concepts.
However, sensing the need to contribute to better understanding of processes under way in this state, its
relations with other powers and perspectives on key global and regional issues , we resume the regular
coverage and analysis of what we feel are major developments that will inevitably have significant
impact on Ukraine's policies, its emergent civil society and the general transition process.
We are grateful to our readers for your interest to our publication and the moral support that helped us
to maintain it. It is our hope that you will continue to find the UCIPR Research Update useful and
informative.
Sincerely,
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek
Director of Research
UCIPR
SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO ENSURE ITS SECURITY,
UKRAINE IS DIVIDED IN VIEWS ON KOSOVO AND NATO
While leaders of 19 NATO states and 23 partners gathered in Washington D.C. to celebrate NATO's
50th anniversary, to sum up the progress and to approve a new strategy for the transforming role of the
alliance, the Ukrainian parliament took the fifteenth attempt in the recent four weeks to adopt a
resolution condemning NATO's actions in Yugoslavia and define new contents of the Ukraine-NATO
relationship. The debate and the final document can be viewed as an illustration of Ukraine's "multi-
vector" position, and cast some light on possible scenarios of development of the Ukraine-NATO
relations in the period before and after the forthcoming presidential election in Ukraine.
Since the Kosovo crisis escalated, the Ukrainian parliament has had a number of votes on a strongly
anti-NATO bill developed by communist leader of the foreign relations committee Borys Oliynyk and
a long-standing communist party apparatchik, now chairman of the parliamentary committee for
national security and defence Georgy Kryuchkov, set to arrange a "divorce" between Ukraine and
NATO. The original document sought to forbid Ukraine's membership in any military-political
alliances and outlaw the program of cooperation with NATO decreed by the President.
Although relations with NATO might have become yet another matter of confrontation between the
President and the parliament, President Kuchma explicitly stated that even if the parliament were to
vote for radical change of Ukraine's relations with NATO, the executive authorities would not
necessarily conform to the decision. After the first vote failed with only 191 out of 450 MPs supporting
the bill, Speaker Tkachenko promised he would continue bringing the issue to the agenda. Neither the
Defence Ministry nor the Foreign Ministry agreed to comment on the call for granting military and/or
technical assistance to Yugoslavia, made by Tkachenko, a strong supporter of the idea of Russian-
Belarussian-Ukrainian unity, whose consistent pro-integration efforts have been recently finalized in
Ukrainian parliament's resolution in favor of the state's full membership in the Moscow-dominated CIS
Interparliamentary Assembly. Commenting on the developments, former Ukrainian President Leonid
Kravchuk, now a backer of Leonid Kuchma's re-election bid, told the press: "If I were the President,
after such statements made by the Speaker I would disband the Verkhovna Rada immediately", as the
Speaker is not authorized by the Constitution to change domestic and foreign policy directions that are
set by the President.
After a series of debates and internal bargaining, the bill lost much of its aggressive anti-NATO
rhetoric and was finally approved on April 23, 1999, by the minimum sufficient number of 226 votes,
i.e., a simple majority of the 450-seat Ukrainian parliament. Of 318 MPs present at the session, 226
supported the resolution, 42 MPs voted against it (a noticeable minority of the 122-strong communist
caucus) with 6 abstentions and several MPs who ignored the voting. The documents was adopted only
after the most radical demands to suspend the program of partnership with NATO and to fire "pro-
NATO ideologists" (an obvious hint to Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk and Secretary of the National
Security Council Volodymyr Horbulin) were excluded from the text.
According to the resolution, the parliament of Ukraine condemned "NATO's actions of violence against
Yugoslavia" while also condemning any sorts of ethnic cleansing, and urged the President to speak up
against NATO's attempts to begin ground operations in Yugoslavia. The resolution ordered that the
parliament, the Cabinet and ministries were firm and consistent in advocating Ukraine's national
interests and maintaining the neutral non-allied status stipulated by the Declaration of independence
and confirmed in the "General Directions of Ukrainian Foreign Policy". Although the resolution did not
rule out cooperation with existing and new global and regional security systems, it emphasised that
Ukraine should not join any military-political alliances. The latter may be regarded as a substantial
progress achieved by moderate forces: while a possibility of NATO membership remains highly
hypothetical for Ukraine, the CIS Tashkent pact option seems to be real, particularly if the balance of
power in this state shifts to the left after the October 1999 presidential election.
Describing NATO leaders' intention to start the ground stage of the operation and take the area of the
possible use of force beyond the limits of the alliance and without relevant sanctions of the UN
Security Council as "extremely dangerous", the resolution urges the President to present the national
program of cooperation with NATO for the period till 2001 for discussion and adoption by the
parliament. This demand applies to all other agreements between Ukraine and international
organisations. It is also expected that the parliament will resume debates over the nature and extent of
Ukraine's relations with NATO after the latter's new agenda and strategic concept are published.
Practical recommendations to the head of the state include enhancing Ukraine's mediation efforts (so
far successfully ignored by both parties to the conflict), initiating a peace conference under the auspices
of the UN in Kyiv and a global conference on collective security issues.
To enforce the legal framework for Ukraine's own security arrangements, the parliament demanded on
the Cabinet to develop bills to fill the gaps in legislation on general national security provisions, on
structures, personnel and functions of the Ukrainian armed forces and law-enforcement agencies,
admission and deployment of foreign troops on the Ukrainian territory.
Contrary to Ukraine's commitments within previous disarmament agreements, the parliamentary
resolution ordered the government to take urgent measures to halt dismantlement of strategic aviation
complexes and missile silos. Earlier on, these steps towards disarmament were praised internationally
among the most prominent signs of progress made by Ukraine since independence.
A Balance Sheet
As every action is motivated by considerations and interests, and every outcome has an impact, the
Kosovo conflict may be regarded in terms of its implications for a number of active players, like
NATO, its active observers, like Ukraine, and a major political process, like the forthcoming Ukrainian
presidential election.
NATO:
As it is unlikely that Milosevic will yield to the pressure and agree to the deployment of an
international peacekeeping force under the auspices of NATO and not the UN as he has insisted, and
not the OSCE as suggested by Ukraine, NATO's intention to use ground troops to make the Yugoslav
leader more willing to cooperate - and to save face in the operation that has demonstrated initial
miscalculations of its planners - may become a grim reality soon. Even the agreement to reduce
Yugoslav troops in the province to the pre-conflict limits, reportedly expressed by Milosevic during his
talks with Russia's special envoy Victor Chernomyrdin, may not convince NATO to consider stepping
down and letting the UN become involved in the operation.
The alliance itself may need immense effort to maintain unity of perspectives of its members. After
new members - Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary - joined the alliance, it may be increasingly
difficult to reach consensus necessary for starting the ground operation.
Although the political voice of Russia has been losing strength internationally, NATO cannot ignore
the fact that Russia's position can be completely disregarded. Commenting on Russia's attitude to the
crisis, many analysts point out to the growing unity in anti-NATO sentiments among representatives of
the whole spectrum of Russian political actors and predict a possible "cold war", further militarisation
of Russia and increase in defence spending. Paradoxically, it is not the South-East European states that
have been queuing in the second wave to NATO's open door - and who actually bear part of the burden
associated with the Kosovo crisis - but the Baltic aspirants whose chances to be adopted increase in
direct proportion to deterioration of the West's relations with Russia.
Furthermore, although Western Europe, remembering the UN failure to halt Milosevic's atrocities in
mid-1990's, agreed to a full-scale military operation, the attitude in NATO member states may change
as the operation goes on. As the economic condition of Yugoslavia, ruined by the NATO bombing and
undermined by the international embargo, continues to deteriorate, it is becoming more obvious that
intervention of ground troops may be redundant. On the one hand, it will inevitably result in casualties
among the allied forces and increase the opposition to the operation in the NATO states. On the other
hand, the likely resulting guerrilla war may contribute to further economic devastation of the war-
stricken area and delay the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees now pouring into Western
European states.
While NATO can afford to ignore much of Russia's criticism, it will have to take into account the
protests in Western European states and seek to maintain unity of attitudes within the alliance itself.
Ukraine:
According to director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Yevgeniy Kozhokin, the Kosovo
conflict represents a blend of information and psychological warfare that will be typical for the XXI
century. In his view, the information and psychological factors are no less significant than the military
actions - an argument that is well enhanced by the recent NATO bombing the headquarters of the
Yugoslav state television in Belgrade - and that "an information and psychological fight for Ukraine
has started in the world".
So far Ukraine's involvement has been limited to declaration of peaceful initiatives and some practical
steps like allowing a Yugoslav air company to place seven of its passenger aircraft at Ukrainian
airdromes, inviting refugee children for recreation, and sending humanitarian aid. In mid-April,
Ukraine's Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk confirmed that Ukraine might send a peacekeeping force to
Yugoslavia, but only with approval of the parliament (which is a usual procedure for sending Ukrainian
peacekeepers), as part of an international peacekeeping force under the auspices of the UN or the
OSCE.
Aside the foreign policy and moral dimensions of the Kosovo crisis, another question need to be
addressed: how (and whether at all) Ukraine's losses associated with complying with the international
embargo and the halt of navigation in the Danube will be compensated? While military and political
implications for Ukraine remain theoretical, economically Ukraine has been seriously affected by the
Kosovo crisis. According to chairman of the parliamentary committee for transportation and
communications Yuri Kruk, by early April Ukraine's estimated losses from the economic blockade
have amounted to US$ 6.5 billion - a huge amount for Ukraine - and continue to grow at about US$
600 thousand a day. The Ukrainian Danube shipping company is losing about US$300 thousand a day,
acting head of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department Igor Hrushko confirmed, and added that
in order to address the issue Ukraine had initiated an urgent session of the Danube Commission
member states in Budapest.
Ukraine is not alone in its economic grievances. The Kosovo crisis has had serious economic and
potential environmental implications for the poorer part of Central and Eastern Europe - Yugoslavia,
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova - as well as for economically better-off Hungary, Austria and
Italy. Also, it is mainly Europe that will have to bear the cost of accommodation of hundreds of
thousands of Kosovar refugees who may later be unwilling to return to their ruined homeland.
President Kuchma:
With the Russian leadership indignantly boycotting the NATO summit, Ukraine remains practically the
only state close to the conflict area that publicly deplores the NATO strikes on Yugoslavia while
condemning Milosevic for ethnic cleansing and demanding peaceful resolution to the conflict. From
this perspective, the Ukrainian leader has a dual opportunity to be praised by the West for his measured
approach and peaceful proposals, while simultaneously being condemned by the left-wingers at home
for whatever step he makes towards the West.
Nevertheless, forwarding his peaceful initiatives to NATO and UN leaders, Leonid Kuchma confirmed
that no revision of Ukraine's relations with NATO would follow the Kosovo crisis and solemnly stated
at the NATO summit that Ukraine was prepared to support any "constructive decision" on Kosovo.
Almost immediately after the initial air strikes, President Kuchma announced Ukraine's peaceful
initiative and offered to act as a mediator in the conflict. In an effort to score pre-election "pluses" and
improve Ukraine's image internationally, the President offered a three-step settlement plan that would
involve taking a sequence of simultaneous actions. Initially, the Yugoslav government was supposed to
halt its military operation in Kosovo, withdraw the troops and security forces, create conditions for the
return of refugees under control and protection of an international peacekeeping force under the
auspices of the UN or, possibly, the OSCE, while NATO was supposed to stop the bombing, and the
Kosovars were supposed to stop their military actions at the same time. The international peacekeeping
force were to be deployed simultaneously with the with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army. A
critical detail of the plan was forming the peacekeeping force of representatives of neutral states,
acceptable to all parties to the conflict, led by a political figure authorized by the UN Security Council.
At the second stage of the proposed operation, Kosovo refugees were to return to their homeland,
accompanied by the peacekeepers, and the OSCE was supposed to launch its humanitarian mission to
ensure organized return and accommodation of refugees and the forcibly displaced population.
The third stage would involve organizing a peace conference in the capital of one of neutral states. To
facilitate implementation of the plan, the international community, states and international
organizations were expected to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and where large numbers
of refugees arrive.
The proposals were very similar to the ones made by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and yet, it
took American, UN and NATO leadership about a month to mention them as a positive and welcome
contribution to the process. Shortly after Leonid Kuchma's proposals were made, the arguments that
Ukraine had a positive experience of preventing conflict escalation on its own territory, sending a
peacekeeping force to the Balkans, assisting peaceful settlement in Abkhazia and the Transniestria did
not prevent U.S. President Bill Clinton from remarking that Ukraine had interethnic problems of its
own.
Although cost-effective and logical, the plan may not be possible unless all of the parties involved
agree to it - the very problem that has not been overcome yet. Furthermore, apart from making the
proposal, Ukraine has little to help its implementation. The President may be forces to answer a series
of unpleasant questions about the involvement of Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion in Bosnia and face
the choice of either withdrawing the Ukrainian peacekeepers, or keeping them in Bosnia under
Ukrainian command, or ordering them to take part in combat action under the allied command. In the
last case a new approval of the parliament will be required, and the pledged participation of Ukrainian
peacekeepers may be made impossible if the parliament decides to show consistency and ban any
involvement of Ukrainian troops other than under the auspices of the UN or the OSCE.
Following Leonid Kuchma's arrival to the United States, most of Ukraine's leading newspapers
published similar and rather dull accounts of President Clinton's and UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan's expressed approval of Ukraine's peaceful initiatives for Kosovo. However, it seems that what
actually matters is Ukrainian President's explicitly demonstrated resolve that Ukraine and NATO
should remain "special partners" whatever the domestic political and economic implications for this
state may be, and, possibly, become even "more special" as an award for the measured and politically
correct "no cleansing, no bombing" position.
Yevhen Marchuk:
Yevhen Marchuk, who has been perceived as a pro-European and generally pro-Western leader,
recently made several strongly negative comments on NATO's intention to introduce ground troops in
Yugoslavia. Commenting on the Kosovo crisis in October 1998, Yevhen Marchuk argued that "such a
strike [on Yugoslavia], if not sanctioned by the UN Security Council, will be an unprecedented legal
and political "default" of the West. A rejection of the great advance made to the international
community. A rejection of its commitments to be a civilized political and legal leader, to build Europe
without division lines, to create a global security model taking into account interests of all countries
and peoples." Now NATO military operation in Yugoslavia is said to be the only way to stop Milosevic
from harassing and exterminating Kosovars. According to Marchuk, if Russia follows the NATO
intention with its decision to grant military assistance to Yugoslavia, Ukraine should let the Russian
troops through its territory. "We must force the West to respect our national interests. Europe and the
USA, in my view, have started to recall them very seldom... For that, one will have to stir the public
opinion, psychologically "attack" the Western political establishment. Until it starts paying attention to
our point of view." (Den, 20 April 1999). In his view, there is a need to understand that long-standing
mutual grievances can hardly be resolved within several weeks of negotiations, particularly under the
immense and biased pressure from the outside, as it is the case - and it is hard to disagree with him on
that. Commenting on negative implications of the NATO way of settling the Kosovo conflict, Marchuk
argues that if the precedent of territorial integrity in the case of Yugoslavia is compromised, no state
that has compact ethnic minority settlements on its territory can be safe, as the precedent will pose a
"terrible and direct danger" to them. The beginning of a ground operation, he argues, will start a
general European crisis and ruin international law, and adds that "NATO is currently discussing some
scenarios that radically differ from Ukraine's national interests". It is likely that the issue of Ukraine's
national interests and its proximity to the "grey zone" of insecurity will be the arguments employed by
critics of the current foreign and security policies.
Kosovo Crisis: Opportunities for Ukrainian Presidential Candidates:
The Kosovo crisis is being used by the incumbent President's rivals for gaining support of voters who
share pro-Communist, pro-Russian, pan-Slavic and anti-NATO sentiments. While there is nothing
original in arguments of confirmed left-wingers' like communist leader Petro Symonemko, chairwoman
of Progressive Socialists Natalia Vitrenko or parliamentary Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko who,
notwithstanding other differences, are united in their pledges to disrupt the Ukraine-NATO relations,
even relatively moderate candidates like Oleksandr Moroz and Yevhen Marchuk argue that the security
"grey zone" in Europe makes it difficult to find arguments in favor or Ukraine's independent and
neutral status. The growing anti-Western sentiments, particularly in the traditionally Russian-oriented
east and south of Ukraine, has significantly enhanced the left-wingers' chances in the forthcoming
presidential elections. The situation in Yugoslavia can inspire left-wingers and other opponents in the
Ukrainian parliament to NATO bombing in Yugoslavia to demand closer military cooperation with
Russia and urge President Kuchma to make anti-NATO steps like cancelling the "Peace Shield"
international military exercise planned to take place in Ukraine later this year within the Ukraine-
NATO special partnership Charter and Ukraine's commitments within the Partnership for Peace.
While many in Russia genuinely believe the state's mission is to protect Serbs, in Ukraine the attitude
to the developments has been more pragmatic. As one of Socialist leaders Ivan Chyzh recently put it,
"the use of the fact of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and the issue of Ukraine's relations with NATO
in the election campaign fits well into traditional campaign technologies. The theme of protecting the
Slavs is being used for getting political scores and transforms into a routine election campaign slogan".
However, if the conflict is not finally resolved by the end of this year (which is likely to be the case if
NATO ground troops intervene and have to face guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia), and if the October
presidential election is won by a left-winger, Ukraine's policy towards the situation in Yugoslavia and
to NATO in general may change, as it is the president who determines the state's foreign and security
policy. Although it is still unlikely that under such worst-case scenario Ukraine will seriously consider
involvement in the conflict on the Serbs' side, there is a real chance that it will be moving rapidly
towards full membership in the CIS common defence and security structures, primarily the Tashkent
pact.
As the presidential campaign is rising in Ukraine, both the left advocates of closer ties with the former
Soviet "brother nations" and their new formation opponents, the incumbent President included, are
trying to gain as much as possible from the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. No matter what the
expected Strategic Concept and the Military Partnership Program will involve, communists will protest
both the bombing, and the mere existence of NATO, and, particularly, President Kuchma's support for
the alliance expressed by his visit to Washington for the celebration of NATO anniversary. Although
traditionally the predominant majority of Ukrainian voters do not see candidates' perspectives on
relations with NATO as key factors that determine their choice in favor or against a particular
candidate, the presence of over 60% of NATO critics in the electorate cannot be disregarded in the
election year.
A Few Options for Ukraine
Apparently, Ukrainian left-wingers' radical anti-NATO intentions have been discouraged by Russian
President Boris Yeltsin's statement that outruled the possibility of Russian's military involvement.
However, if NATO's plans for sending ground troops to Kosovo are realized, and the Russian position
radicalizes, there will be more pressure for revision of Ukraine's neutral and nuclear-free status. The
start has been made by the call for halting the dismantlement of missile silos, stipulated in the recent
parliamentary resolution. Although technically Ukraine has neither capacity for resources to restore its
nuclear capability, the very fact that the state's legislature is seriously discussing that option should ring
the alarm bell.
